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conducted to examine the influence of front-group stealth campaigns on a variety of
measures. It was anticipated that corporate front-group stealth campaigns, which feature
names that mask the true interests of sponsors, positively affect public opinion, unless
they are exposed as intentionally misleading, in which case they boomerang against
sponsors. The experiment examined the potential of the inoculation strategy to preempt
the influence of corporate front-group stealth campaigns. The pattern of results sup-
ported all of these expectations. Front-group stealth campaigns proved to be effective, at
least in the short term. Front-group stealth campaigns eroded public attitudes toward the
issue in question and boosted perceptions of the front group, but not the corporate spon-
sor. However, when front-group stealth campaigns were subsequently exposed, positive
effects dissipated and perceptions of corporate sponsors boomeranged. Results revealed
that inoculation can protect against the influence of front-group stealth campaigns.Keywords: front group; inoculation; stealth campaign73
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potential antidotes to corporate front-group stealth campaigns: the post hoc exposure
of front-group stealth initiatives and preemptive inoculation.
Front-group stealth campaigns involve sponsors, sometimes individually, but
much more often collectively through interest groups, seeking to influence public
opinion using deceptive names. Although a number of corporations, including Dow
Chemical, Mobil, Ford, and Philip Morris, participate in corporate front-group stealth
campaigns (Beder, 1998), no empirical studies have examined their influence on
public opinion. The current study initially examines the influence of corporate front-
group stealth campaigns on perceptions of the image, reputation, credibility, and cit-
izenship of collective associations and their corporate sponsors.
We would like to believe that deceptive practices are ineffective. However, we
suspect that deceptive efforts are persuasive. It is clear that corporate front-group
stealth campaigns have grown more prevalent (Beder, 1998). The critical question is,
What can be done about it? This investigation posits that preemption and post hoc
exposure are effective strategies for undermining the effectiveness of front-group
stealth campaigns and then tests this premise.
Origin and Nature of Front-Group Stealth Campaigns
Front groups, or “independent third-party groups,” were first used by Edward
Bernays (Stauber & Rampton, 1995). Third-party endorsement or “outreach” (Reilly,
2003) is a long-standing public relations strategy. The assumption is that organiza-
tions not connected to the sponsor have greater credibility and, therefore, are more
influential. Third-party endorsements are considered to be a “successful” public rela-
tions campaign strategy (“Third-Party,” 2003).
The difference between ethical uses of third-party endorsement and the use of
front groups is subtle. Ethical use of third-party endorsement relies on existing groups
that are well known and credible, whereas front groups are usually created by spon-
sors for the purpose of shielding their identity. According to the Public Relations
Society (PRSA) of America, front groups seek to influence “by disguising or obscur-
ing the true identity of their members or implying representation of a much more
broadly based group” (“PRSA Speaking Out,” 1995, p. 1). In other words, the use of
front groups is designed to shield the true identity of sponsors. In commercial terms,
the most common use is on the part of corporations who work collectively through
industry-based associations. We add the term stealth when these associations adopt
names that serve to hide true interests of sponsors or, even worse, to misrepresent
their positions. Front-group stealth campaigns appear to represent one agenda but, in
fact, serve a very different agenda, often an agenda that is the opposite of what the
group’s name implies. Such campaigns are designed to influence via deception. In
essence, they are “fraudulent campaigns” (“Ethics Month,” 2004, p. 10).
The deceptive use of front groups is a violation of the PRSA Code of Ethics. The
PRSA Code specifically identifies front groups as an example of improper conduct
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that violates provisions on full disclosure of information. PRSA members were cau-
tioned during the 2004 Bush and Kerry presidential campaign that “assisting front
groups that represent undisclosed sponsorships and/or deceptive or misleading descrip-
tions of goals, causes, tactics, sponsors or participants constitutes improper con-
duct . . . and should be avoided” (“PRSA’s Stand,” 2004, p. 14).
Americans have grown used to front-group stealth campaigns in politics, where
interest groups adopt names that hide or misrepresent their true beliefs, raise funds,
and launch campaigns for, but more often against, candidates or causes. This inves-
tigation, however, is interested in the use of front-group stealth in the commercial
arena, although findings about their influence or the potential of antidotes may gen-
eralize to the political realm. Corporate use of front-group stealth campaigns has
proliferated in recent years (Beder, 1998; Ellwanger, 2006; Rampton & Stauber,
2001). Some corporations have discovered that, when they seek to influence atti-
tudes about public policy, it is useful to disguise one’s views “behind a name that
suggests apparent objectivity,” or even better, behind a name that suggests positive
social values (Crossen, 1994, p. 146). They have deluded themselves into believing
that the end justifies any means, including the use of names that communicate
“corrupt information” (Crossen, 1994, p. 16).
The use of front-group stealth campaigns in the commercial realm is even more seri-
ous than their use in politics: for two reasons. First, corporate campaigns are often more
deceptive than their political cousins because the names chosen for corporate front
groups are much more likely selected with the intent to deceive, not just to hide spon-
sors’ true intentions. Beder (1998) maintained that “the names of corporate front groups
are carefully chosen to mask the real interests behind them” (p. 27). Second, whereas
political initiatives are almost always contested—by the candidate who is attacked, by
527 groups who support the candidate under attack, and/or by journalists covering the
campaign—corporate front-group stealth campaigns are seldom challenged; they tend
to function under the radar screen and, as a result, their influence is more insidious.
Beder (1998) suggested the use of front groups and other advocacy groups allows
corporations to take part in government behind community concerns, and “the names
given to many of the [front groups] are confusing, if not downright deceptive”
(Wilcox, Cameron, Ault, & Agee, 2003, p. 72). For example, Exxon-Mobil funds
front groups such as the Competitive Enterprise Institute and has for years funded
U.S. advertising campaigns to convince the public that global warming is not a prob-
lem (“Behind the Lines,” 2002). Likewise, Mokhiber (2000) alleged that Citizens for
Better Medicare is a front group set up by the pharmaceutical industry to protect its
multibillion-dollar profits.
The Influence of Front-Group Stealth Campaigns
We suspect that use of front-group stealth campaigns is so widespread because
they work. Company communication specialists have discovered the lessons of
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corporate social responsibility: that people positively view organizations that appear
to resonate with their own values (Cone, 2004). Indeed, many corporations—Dow
Chemical, Mobil, DuPont, Amoco, Ford, Philip Morris, Pfizer, Monsanto, Proctor
and Gamble, and others—are involved in multiple front groups (Beder, 1998).
However, the impact of front-group stealth campaign initiatives has never been doc-
umented. The next section explores the reasons why such initiatives should work,
offering a rationale based on theoretical explanations drawn from political science,
philosophy, psychology, and public relations.
Front-Group Stealth Campaigns Presume Low-Involved Receivers
One explanation for why front-group stealth campaigns are effective is that the
public is inherently low involved on matters of public policy and, hence, most people
are unlikely to cognitively engage messages. As a result, deceptive titles and catchy
slogans are able to exert considerable influence. A number of 20th century thinkers,
including Lippmann (1922), Bernays (1923, 1928), and Dahl (1963) argued that the
public is guided not by thought but by emotion and sentiment. They just don’t care
enough about public policy content to carefully scrutinize messages. Bernays (1928)
believed that people “are largely uninterested” in public affairs (p. 117). Instead people
are preoccupied with private affairs, making a living and being entertained, preoccu-
pations that Arendt (1958) said distinguish mass societies. Lupia and McCubbins
(1998) maintained that people are so involved with families, jobs, hobbies, and social
commitments that they have little time left to inform themselves on political issues.
Dahl (1961) agreed that politics has low salience in the lives of most individuals.
“Despite the great quantity of information about politics pressing in on all sides, the
average citizen is remarkably deaf and blind to everything not of vital interest to
him” (p. 264). Dahl believed that politics “lies for most people at the outer periph-
ery of attention, interest, concern and activity” (p. 279). Instead, “at the focus of
most men’s lives are primary activities. . . . [These] activities—not politics—are the
primary concerns of most men and women” (p. 279).
Given limited interest in public affairs, people seek short cuts (Lupia, 1994). They
function as “cognitive misers” (Stroh, 1995), oversimplifying complex content,
seeking quick rather than accurate resolution, and rarely examining the basis of their
beliefs or changing them (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Popkin (1991) described the short-
cuts that people use to assess public affairs content as “low-information rationality.”
He maintained that the method is practical for people in a hurry. “It is a method of
combining, in an economical way, learning and information from past experiences,
daily life, the media and political campaigns” (p. 7). Dahl (1961) believed that even
people who manifest interest in public affairs employ shortcuts to reduce effort. He
explained that, “even for someone to whom politics is important, it is easier to be
merely interested than to be active,” that “interest is cheap, whereas activity is rela-
tively expensive” (p. 280).
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In such a low-information environment, the content of messages is reduced to
simple symbols and images. Bernays and others argued early on that effective per-
suasive messages must exploit simple symbols and images designed to connect with
the values and interests of the audience. Lippmann (1922) believed that images and
symbols could shape public opinion, and in the hands of persuasion-savvy elites,
they could be used to achieve the “manufacture of consent.” Ewen (1996) maintained
that, “Lippmann saw the strategic employment of media images as the secret to mod-
ern power; the means by which leaders and special interests might cloak themselves
in the ‘fiction’ that they stand as delegates of the common good” (p. 157).
Lippmann (1992) believed that simple symbols and images are able to trigger
emotional responses in targeted receivers and at the same time undermine critical
thought. However, he argued that symbols must be easily recognizable and resonate
with accepted values of receivers. Popkin concurred. He (Popkin, 1991) argued that
successful campaigns employ “symbols which are already clear and well-known”
(p. 103). When corporate front-group stealth campaigns utilize catchy names, such
as the “Coalition for Clean Air,” they are making a statement about their alleged val-
ues that they think will resonate with those who support a clean environment, and
they are counting on two things: one, that most receivers are not motivated to probe
their messages much beyond the name, and second, that their deceit will go unchal-
lenged by the elite media. On both counts, we suspect that they are correct.
The position that low-involved message processing is unique, eschewing thinking
about arguments and evidence in favor of shortcuts, is captured in the dual process-
ing models that came to dominate social psychology for three decades and have
found their way into other disciplines. The elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986) and the heuristic systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, 1987) posit
that high- and low-involved message processing are distinct. High-involved process-
ing, termed central in the ELM and systematic in the HSM, is deliberate and thought-
ful. The quality of the arguments and evidence offered are focal points. By contrast,
low-involved message processing is more mindless. In the ELM, it results in periph-
eral processing, with emphasis on source considerations, the number of arguments
presented, background music, pictorial images, and names (Gardiner, Mitchell, &
Russo, 1985; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann,
1983), and in the HSM it results in heuristic processing, with emphasis on “a vari-
ety of extrinsic persuasion cues” (Chaiken, 1987, p. 32) that take the form of personal
decision rules that “associate heuristic cues with a probability that the advocated
position is valid” (Todorov, Chaiken, & Henderson, 2002, p. 197). One example of
such a rule is “I agree with groups that support my values.”
Not only is low-involved message processing inherently superficial, consisting of
few, if any, informational cues (Todorov et al., 2002), but it also interferes with the
capacity to process message substance. Early research on the effects of distraction in
persuasion revealed that external distraction disrupted argument processing, reducing
people’s ability to produce counterarguments (Keating & Brock, 1974; Osterhouse
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& Brock, 1970), and thereby reducing the importance of strong arguments in influ-
ence (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976). Subsequent research indicated that, when people
were distracted, peripheral cues, such as source credibility, played a more significant
role in persuasion (Kiesler & Mathog, 1968; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). If peripheral
and/or heuristic processing inhibits counterarguing, the process people use to protect
their attitudes from change, then it also should render people more susceptible to
persuasion. Studies reveal that peripheral and/or heuristic processing, compared to
central and/or systematic processing, renders attitudes less persistent and more resis-
tant to attack (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Eagly, 1983; Mackie, 1987; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986).
Front-Group Stealth Campaigns Assume Truth Is Malleable
Another explanation for the success of front-group efforts lies in the study of self-
presentation, particularly how people, as targets of influence attempts, respond to the
self-presentation efforts of others (Schlenker, 2003). Self-presentation relies heavily
on impression management, a technique for shaping an audience’s impression of a
person, group, object, or idea. Many times, impression management may involve
outright deceit, which often goes undetected by observers, even in close relation-
ships (DePaulo, 1994).
Because people utilize impression management and, therefore, deception in their
daily lives (Schlenker, 2003), they are willing to give others, including message
sources, some latitude and assume their self-presentations are authentic. This corre-
spondence bias describes people’s inclinations to attribute the behavior of others to
internal states (Jones, 1990). Research indicates that the correspondence bias is even
more pronounced when receivers are not engaged in active message processing
(Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988).
Goffman (1959) indicated that people are predisposed to believe that others are
offering authentic selves and are communicating truthfully. He called this “truth
bias” and argued that it is pervasive and persistent.
In the public arena, the notion of truth as malleable dates to the early 20th
century and the writings of American philosopher William James. In Pragmatism,
James (1907) argued that there are no absolute truths, but that truth is what is per-
ceived and, therefore, relative. James (1995) proclaimed that “truth happens to an
idea. It becomes true, is made true by events” (pp. 77-78). In other words, percep-
tion is reality.
James’s writings influenced the two most prominent public relations councils of
the era, Ivy Ledbetter Lee and Edward Bernays. Lee, a former journalist, accepted
James’s notion that “truth happens to an idea.” Lee argued that facts represent noth-
ing more than “an attempt to give you my interpretation of the facts,” and that, if
“suitable facts” could be gathered and disseminated, then “they become truth” (in
Ewen, 1996, pp. 80-81). James and Lippmann influenced Bernays, who insisted that
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news was “subjective” and could be created (Ewen, 1996). Indeed, Bernays often
created pseudo events by staging seemingly spontaneous events and was the first to
use the term front group (Bernays, 1928).
If truth is indeed malleable, then it is easy to understand how front groups could
select names strategically: names that resonate with targeted receivers’ values,
although they absolutely misrepresent the true intentions of sponsors. Such stealth
efforts may be effective in shaping public perceptions; however, they also should
prove to be unstable because they are grounded in deception. James recognized the
instability of “truth” arrived at in this way. James claimed that perception is truth, at
least if unchallenged. He compared truth to paper currency (in an era in which cur-
rency was backed by gold). He (James, 1907) explained that truth exists on a credit
system and is passed along as long as no one challenges it, just like bank notes that
are passed along until no one accepts them.
However, any benefits of front-group stealth campaigns would, necessarily, be
limited to the specific attitude object, formed by equating the title of the front group
with a desirable value, and would not transfer to unidentified corporate sponsors
who, after all, remain invisible behind the scenes. Hence, it is not anticipated that
front-group stealth campaigns affect people’s perceptions of the image or credibility
of corporate sponsors.
Furthermore, any impact on specific attitude objects should be ephemeral because
research suggests that perceptions formed in low-involvement circumstances lack
persistence and are more susceptible to change (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Eagly,
1983; Krosnick, 1988; Mackie, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). This would be espe-
cially true for perceptions formed as the result of impression management. Hence, it
is predicted:
Hypothesis 1: Front-group stealth campaigns are effective in influencing people’s per-
ceptions about the targeted attitude object and in enhancing people’s perceptions of
the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship of the front group itself; however,
such campaigns fail to influence public perceptions of the corporate sponsors of
front groups.
In addition, there is the potential that front-group stealth campaigns may backfire,
if their true motives are made public. If such campaigns are challenged—if their ini-
tiatives are exposed as deceptive—then it is anticipated that front-group stealth cam-
paigns would backfire, not only against efforts to shape the attitude object but also
against perceptions of front groups and of their corporate sponsors. Thus, the current
study posits that
Hypothesis 2: If front-group initiatives are exposed as deceptive, it results in a back-
lash, which undermines
1. public perceptions of the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship of the
front group;
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2. public perceptions of the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship of cor-
porate sponsors of the front group.
An Antidote to the Influence of Front-Group
Stealth Campaigns
More than 40 years ago, McGuire (1964) shifted his focus from persuasion to
approaches to induce resistance to persuasion. He (McGuire, 1970) reasoned, “The pre-
occupation of many social scientists with techniques for social influence has provoked
increasing interest in techniques for developing resistance to persuasion” (p. 36). This
phase of the investigation examines the potential of the inoculation strategy to confer
resistance to the influence of corporate front-group stealth campaigns.
Borrowing from a medical analogy, McGuire (1961b) argued that administration
of inoculation treatments work much like a vaccination: Individuals receive “weak-
ened, defense stimulating forms of . . . counterarguments” (p. 327) that strengthen
attitudes so that they are resistant to potential counterattacks that people might come
in contact with. Inoculation works through two mechanisms: Threat seeks to get
receivers to acknowledge the potential vulnerability of an attitude to influence and
functions as the motivational catalyst for resistance; refutational preemption raises
and systematically refutes specific challenges to attitudes and provides the ammuni-
tion that can be used in counterarguing (McGuire, 1961b, 1964; Pfau, 1997). Early
studies by McGuire (1961a, 1961b, 1962, 1964, 1966; McGuire & Papageorgis,
1962; Papageorgis & McGuire, 1961) and later studies by Pfau and colleagues (Pfau,
1997; Pfau et al., 2004; Pfau et al., 2003; Pfau, Szabo, et al., 2001), which opera-
tionalized threat and counterarguing, indicated that inoculation works, with the lat-
ter studies confirming that both of the theorized mechanisms play instrumental roles
in resistance.
“There is no question that inoculation works” (Pfau et al., 2003, p. 39); support-
ing evidence is considerable. However, it is a myriad of applications of inoculation
that make the theory so interesting. Inoculation has been applied to a number of
applied contexts, in essence, protecting people’s attitudes from persuasive campaign
messages: in marketing (Compton & Pfau, 2004; Pfau, 1992), public relations
(Burgoon, Pfau, & Birk, 1995; Wan & Pfau, 2004), politics (An & Pfau, 2004; Pfau
& Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, & Sorenson, 1990), and other domains.
Inoculation treatments work largely by motivating receivers to bolster attitudes.
It isn’t dependent on the specific content contained in the refutational preemption
phase of the inoculation treatment. That’s what gives inoculation its power: A single
inoculation treatment is capable of providing “a blanket of protection” that extends
well beyond the specific content covered in the message (Pfau, 1997, p. 137). The
best evidence for the potential of generic treatments is found in the research on refu-
tational same and different treatments. Refutational same treatments raise and refute
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the same arguments featured in a subsequent attack; refutational different treat-
ments feature generic arguments that are not contained in a later attack. Research
findings consistently indicate that inoculation is equally effective whether refutational
same and different treatments are used (McGuire, 1961a, 1962, 1964; McGuire &
Papageorgis, 1962; Papageorgis & McGuire, 1961; Pfau, 1992, 1997; Pfau & Burgoon,
1988; Pfau et al., 2004; Pfau et al., 1990; Pfau et al., 2003; Pfau, Szabo, et al., 2001;
Pfau et al., 1997).
The ability of inoculation different treatments to protect against, quite literally, all
possible counterarguments suggests that use of a generic inoculation message that tar-
gets the broad class of front-group stealth campaigns should be able to confer resis-
tance to a specific front-group stealth campaign message that an individual may
encounter. Furthermore, a study by Pfau, Park, Holbert, and Cho (2001) portends
effectiveness. This Pfau et al. study used generic inoculation treatments against the
corrosive influence of soft-money-sponsored political ads used to target candidates in
the 2000 presidential campaign. The generic inoculation messages were effective in
combating the damage of various specific soft-money ads to democratic values. Thus,
this investigation predicts that, in comparison to individuals who receive no inocula-
tion (controls), for those individuals who receive a generic inoculation pretreatment,
Hypothesis 3: Inoculation messages confer resistance to the influence of front-group
stealth campaigns.
Method
The purpose of the current investigation was to assess the influence of corporate
front-group stealth campaigns, in which companies join with others and adopt names
designed to deceive. In addition, the investigation examined the effects of post hoc
exposure of the deceptive practices of front-group stealth campaigns, and it explored
the efficacy of an antidote to the influence of front-group stealth initiatives in the
form of preemptive inoculation.
Selection of Exemplars
The first step was to select the companies and/or groups for inclusion in the current
study. After examining a number of front groups who campaign on a variety of issues,
investigators chose three active, established front-group exemplars, including front-
group campaigns designed to: oppose government efforts to restrict wetlands’ devel-
opment or to regulate developers, oppose federal efforts to control prescription drug
prices under Medicare, and oppose federal or state regulatory efforts to reduce litter.
The front groups used in the current study campaigned on these issues, selecting
names for their groups that suggest support for values that, it was assumed, would
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resonate with most citizens (e.g., preserving U.S. wetlands, reducing drug prices
under Medicare, and reducing litter) but in fact sought to undermine government
action to achieve these ends. The three front groups selected for the current study,
one for each of the causes, were: the National Wetlands Coalition (NWC), Citizens
for Better Medicare (CBM), and Keep America Beautiful (KAB). Information about
these front groups was secured from their Web sites, and information exposing them
as front groups was retrieved online. A single, prominent corporate sponsor was
selected for each of the front groups from among actual sponsors. Exxon-Mobil was
chosen from among the corporate sponsors of NWC, Merck Pharmaceutical from
the sponsors of CBM, and Pepsi-Cola from the sponsors of KAB.
Participants
Participants for the current study were recruited from introductory communica-
tion classes at three midwestern universities. A total of 204 research participants
completed all four phases of the study (a retention rate of 92.2% of those who began
the study at Phase 1).
Experimental Materials
Researchers prepared multiple messages for use in the investigation. Three front-
group stealth campaign messages were prepared, one for each group. The messages
were designed as press releases sponsored by the front group. Content was drawn
from the front group’s Web site. Front-group stealth campaign messages contained
persuasive arguments designed to support the respective positions of the NWC,
CBM, and KAB on the issues in question: National Wetlands Coalition supports
“balanced” and “reasonable” development of the nation’s wetlands (and opposes
federal efforts to restrict wetlands’ development or regulate developers); Citizens for
Better Medicare urges “improvements” to Medicare through the use of “private sec-
tor-based prescription drug benefits” (and opposes federal efforts to control pre-
scription prices under Medicare); and Keep America Beautiful urges education and
voluntary cleanup initiatives to reduce litter (and opposes federal or state regulatory
efforts designed to reduce litter). Front-group stealth campaign messages ranged in
length from 439 to 448 words.
Three messages designed to expose the front groups and the organizations that
fund them were prepared, one for each cause. The messages were designed as news
stories. Content was drawn from news stories exposing the front group and its spon-
sors, except that each message was adapted so as to identify only the single sponsor
serving as the exemplar in the current study. These messages ranged from 443 to 448
words.
A single inoculation message was written to preempt the influence of front-group
stealth campaign messages. The message contained generic content about the
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prevalence and the deceptive nature of front-group stealth campaigns. The inoculation
message was designed to resemble a press release. It led with the header, “Beware
of Groups that Seek to Mislead.” A fictitious group called Citizens for Corporate
Responsibility was used as the source of the inoculation message. The first para-
graph of the inoculation message was designed to elicit threat. Threat was opera-
tionalized as warning of impending, potentially influential campaign initiatives on
the part of front groups that are designed to change your values about the issue in
question. The message employed statistics and anecdotal evidence to warn about the
deceptive practices of front-group stealth campaigns. Length of the inoculation mes-
sage was 648 words.
A dummy message was also created to administer to participants not receiving an
inoculation message (controls). The dummy message was an editorial, “Foul Mouth
and Manhood,” written by Anna Quindlen, which appeared in Newsweek on July 12,
2004. It was edited down to 648 words, the same length as the inoculation message.
The content of the dummy message was completely irrelevant to front-group stealth
campaigns or the specific causes being addressed by those chosen campaigns. Rather,
the dummy message addressed a wholly irrelevant question: the use of foul language
in politics.
Procedures
The investigation was conducted in four phases. During Phase 1, the participants
completed a questionnaire designed to provide basic sociodemographic information
and to assess initial attitude and involvement levels on each of the three issues. After
they completed Phase 1 questionnaires, participants returned them to an experimenter
who examined the attitude results to determine whether participants had revealed a
positive attitude on one or more of three issues (favoring government action: to restrict
wetlands’ development, control prescription prices under Medicare, or reduce litter).
If participants manifested a positive attitude on only one issue, they were assigned
randomly to either inoculation or control condition on that issue. If they displayed a
positive attitude on two or more issues, participants were assigned randomly to either
the inoculation or control condition on one of the favored issues in such a way so that
the number of participants across the three issues remained relatively balanced.
Although researchers sought a relatively equal distribution of participants across
exemplars, they desired a roughly 6 to 4 ratio of inoculation to control participants.
Researchers sought to achieve balance across all cells in terms of initial attitude:
across exemplars and between inoculation and control conditions.
Researchers also attempted to ensure balance across cells on initial involvement
levels. Issue involvement is the importance or salience of a particular attitude object
to a receiver (Zaichkowsky, 1985). In the ELM and HSM, involvement is consid-
ered to be instrumental in determining people’s motivation to process messages
(Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Also, involvement functions as an important
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moderating variable in inoculation research (Pfau et al., 2004; Pfau et al., 2003; Pfau
et al., 1997).
Preliminary results suggest that researchers were successful in achieving relative
balance across groups on initial attitudes and involvement levels on the issues of
favoring government action to restrict wetlands’ development, control prescription
prices under Medicare, and reduce litter. Balance was achieved: across exemplars
(NWC, n = 69: initial attitude, M = 5.50, involvement, M = 4.88; CBM, n = 67: initial
attitude, M = 5.65, involvement, M = 5.06; and KAB, n = 68: initial attitude, M =
5.67, involvement, M = 5.02); and between inoculation and control conditions (inoc-
ulation, n = 116: initial attitude, M = 5.62, involvement, M = 5.06; control, n = 88:
initial attitude, M = 5.51, involvement, M = 4.98). None of these differences were
statistically significant. Initial attitude and issue involvement featured 7-interval
scales, which are described in detail in the Measures section. The pattern of means
suggests moderate, but relatively positive, initial attitudes and moderate involvement
levels. Moderate issue involvement is important because it constitutes a boundary
condition for inoculation (Pfau et al., 1997).
After being assigned to a condition, participants completed questionnaire items
appropriate to the condition they had been assigned to. Questionnaire items addressed
the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship of the respective front group (either
NWC, CBM, or KAB) and the respective corporate sponsor (either Exxon-Mobil,
Merck Pharmaceutical, or Pepsi-Cola). Phase 1 of the study was administered the
first week in April over 5 days.
Phase 2 of the investigation was administered during the second week in April.
During Phase 2, participants received either an inoculation message or dummy mes-
sage (all participants assigned as controls received a dummy message). Participants
then completed a questionnaire designed to measure elicited threat levels and coun-
terarguing output (the number of arguments contrary to initial attitudes and the
number of responses to those arguments). Phase 2 was administered over 5 days.
Phase 3 was administered during the third week in April. The Phase 3 booklets
contained a single message followed by a questionnaire. Participants received a
front-group stealth campaign message that featured persuasive arguments designed
to support the respective positions of the NWC, CBM, or KAB on the issues in ques-
tion. Following the message, participants completed a questionnaire designed to
assess: attitude toward the issue (government action to restrict wetlands’ develop-
ment, control prescription prices under Medicare, or reduce litter), the image, repu-
tation, credibility, and citizenship of the respective front group (either NWC, CBM,
or KAB), and the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship of the respective cor-
porate sponsor (Exxon-Mobil, Merck Pharmaceutical, or Pepsi-Cola). Phase 3 was
completed over 5 days.
Phase 4 was administered during the fourth week of April. During Phase 4, par-
ticipants read a message that exposed the front group and its respective corporate
sponsor. After completing the message, participants completed a questionnaire that
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assessed attitude toward the issue, the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship
of the respective front group (either NWC, CBM, or KAB), and the image, reputa-
tion, credibility, and citizenship of the respective corporate sponsor (Exxon-Mobil,
Merck Pharmaceutical, or Pepsi-Cola). Phase 3 took 5 days.
Control and Manipulation Check Measures
Issue involvement. Initial issue involvement was used to assign participants to con-
ditions and served as a control variable in the inoculation analyses. Issue involvement
was operationalized as the importance or salience of the issue. It was assessed at
Phase 1 using an adaptation of the Personal Involvement Inventory (PII; Zaichkowsky,
1985). Six items of Zaichkowsky’s PII were used in the current study including: means
nothing/means a lot; unimportant/important, of no concern/of much concern; doesn’t
matter/matters to me; irrelevant/relevant; and insignificant/significant. Reliability of
the issue involvement scale was .94 (n = 204).
Threat and counterarguing output. Threat and counterarguing output functioned
as manipulation checks in the inoculation analyses. Threat and counterarguing out-
put were assessed during Phase 2 for all participants. Elicited threat was measured
using five bipolar adjective pairs used in inoculation studies conducted during the
past 20 years. Participants responded to the prospect that they could come in contact
with persuasive messages that might cause them to rethink their position on the issue
in question. The scale items were: unintimidating/intimidating, safe/dangerous, not
harmful/harmful, nonthreatening/threatening, and not risky/risky. Reliability of the
threat measure was .87 (n = 204).
Counterarguing output was assessed using open-ended responses in which partici-
pants identified possible arguments contrary to their own position and then listed poten-
tial responses to those arguments in the spaces provided. The procedure is based on the
thought-listing technique that was pioneered by Brock (1967) and Greenwald (1968).
However, past use of this technique alone has proven to be inadequate in inoculation
research (Pfau et al., 1997). Eagly and Chaiken (1993) argued that thought listing does
not reflect the amount of cognitive effort expended. In addition, thought listing, by
itself, fails to acknowledge that respondents may view their own thoughts as varying in
power and intensity, in cognitive and affective terms. Therefore, after generating their
list of arguments contrary to their position and responses to those arguments, respon-
dents rated perceived strength of arguments contrary to their position and strength of
responses using a 1- to 7-point scale. No time limit was imposed on participants’ efforts
to identify arguments contrary to positions, list responses to those arguments, or rate the
strength of arguments and responses. However, most participants completed the Phase
2 questionnaire, including these tasks, in fewer than 10 minutes.
One researcher counted number of arguments contrary to attitudes and responses
to those arguments. The researcher counted all declarative statements that opposed a
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participant’s position as an argument contrary to position and all statements that
refuted, or answered, those arguments as a response. One unique response per space
that met the criteria was counted, based on a scoring method previously employed
by Brock (1967), Osterhouse and Brock (1970), and Petty et al. (1976). Redundant
thoughts were excluded.
Because resistance is based on the premise that inoculation treatments trigger the
internal process of generating responses to arguments opposing the individual’s atti-
tude, thus rendering attitudes less resistant to attack, and because the number of
responses, by itself, does not reflect the perceived strength of responses, especially
relative to strength of arguments contrary to attitudes, counterarguing output was
operationalized in relative terms. Counterarguing output was computed, first, by
multiplying the total number of arguments contrary to initial attitude by respondent
perception of the average strength of those arguments and by multiplying the total
number of responses to arguments contrary to initial attitude by respondent percep-
tion of the average strength of those responses. Second, the product of number and
strength of arguments contrary to initial attitude was subtracted from the product of
number and strength of responses.
Dependent Measures
Attitude toward the issue. Participants’ attitudes toward the issue (govern-
ment action to restrict wetlands’ development, control prescription prices under
Medicare, or reduce litter) were measured at Phases 1, 3, and 4. Attitude was
assessed on all three issues at Phase 1 and, for those participants assigned to the
front-group stealth phase of the study, on the particular issue they were assigned to,
during Phases 3 and 4. Attitude toward the issue was measured with six bipolar
adjective pairs developed by Burgoon, Cohen, Miller, and Montgomery (1978) and
used in persuasion research for more than 25 years. Adjective pairs included:
wrong/right, negative/positive, unfavorable/favorable, unacceptable/acceptable, foolish/
wise, and bad/good. The alpha reliabilities of the attitude toward issue measure
were: at Phase 1, .92 (n = 204); at Phase 3, .96 (n = 203); and at Phase 4, .96 (n = 204).
Measures of perceptions of front groups and their corporate sponsors. People’s
perceptions of the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship of front groups and
their corporate sponsors were assessed during Phases 1, 3, and 4. The measures
employed were developed by Dowling (2001). Dowling developed the measures as
a result of his frustration with long-established measures employed by Fortune to
identify America’s Most Admired Companies. Dowling argued that Fortune’s mea-
sures fail to distinguish a number of distinct dimensions such as corporate image and
reputation. Dowling (2001) factor analyzed his measures and maintained that his mea-
sures clearly distinguish between the dimensions of image, reputation, credibility,
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and citizenship. Dowling’s measures of people’s perceptions of organizations have
been adopted by a number of large marketing firms.
Dowling (2001) conceptualized corporate image as people’s global perceptions of
an organization. “Corporate image . . . represents stakeholders’ shared beliefs about
what is distinctive, central and enduring about the organization” (p. 215). Image is
based on organizational behavior and consists of cognition and emotion. Dowling’s
image measure consists of five 7-interval, Likert-type items that denote the name of
the organization and the following characteristics: appears to be well managed,
appears to be technologically driven, appears to be successful, appears to be innov-
ative, appears to be customer focused (or for front groups, appears to be member
focused), and appears to be competitive. Alpha reliabilities of the image measure
were: for front groups: Phase 1, .79 (n = 204); Phase 3, .72 (n = 203); and Phase 4,
.80 (n = 204); and for corporate sponsors of front groups: Phase 1, .68 (n = 204);
Phase 3, .88 (n = 204); and Phase 4, .87 (n = 204).
Dowling (2001) viewed corporate reputation as “the attributed values evoked
from the person’s corporate image” (p. 19). Dowling maintained that reputation
reflects the underlying values of an organization whereas image reflects organiza-
tional behavior. He argued that reputation comprises “value-based descriptions of
the organization and are designed to reflect stakeholders’ values” (p. 215). In this
investigation, reputation was measured using four Likert-type items that feature the
name of the organization and the following attributes: appears to be an industry
leader, appears to be honest, appears to be a good corporate citizen, and appears to
be respected. Alpha reliabilities of the reputation measure were: for front groups:
Phase 1, .77 (n = 204); Phase 3, .80 (n = 203); and Phase 4, .85 (n = 204); and for
the corporate sponsors of front groups: Phase 1, .77 (n = 204); Phase 3, .84 (n = 204);
and Phase 4, .83 (n = 204).
Dowling (2001) considered organizational credibility as an output variable.
Image and reputation may affect perceptions of an organization’s credibility.
Credibility was measured using four Likert-type scales that list the name of the orga-
nization and the following features: appears to have confidence, appears to be trust-
worthy, appears to show support, and appears to have a positive word of mouth.
Alpha reliabilities of the credibility measure were: for front groups: Phase 1, .84 (n =
204); Phase 3, .89 (n = 204); and Phase 4, .86 (n = 204); and for corporate sponsors
of front groups: Phase 1, .84 (n = 204); Phase 3, .87 (n = 204); and Phase 4, .83
(n = 204).
Finally, Dowling (2001) conceptualized corporate citizenship in terms of people’s
global perceptions of the character of an organization. It is an output variable.
Dowling’s citizenship measure consists of five 7-interval, Likert-type scales that
denote the name of the organization and the following attributes: appears to be well
managed, appears to be technologically driven, appears to be successful, appears to be
innovative, appears to be customer focused (or for front groups, appears to be member
focused), and appears to be competitive. Alpha reliabilities of the citizenship measure
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were: for front groups: Phase 1, .84 (n = 204); Phase 3, .86 (n = 204); and Phase 4,
.90 (n = 204); and for corporate sponsors of front groups: Phase 1, .84 (n = 204);
Phase 3, .59 (n = 204); and Phase 4, .90 (n = 202).
Results
The current study examined the influence of corporate front-group stealth cam-
paigns, in which corporations form associations that, in turn, adopt names that are
designed to misrepresent their true intentions. Assuming that front-group stealth
campaigns are effective, the study examined two potential remedies: the use of post
hoc exposure of corporate sponsors and their intentions and the use of preemptive
inoculation.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that front-group a stealth campaigns are effective in influenc-
ing targeted attitudes, eroding initial attitudes favoring federal efforts to restrict wet-
lands’ development, federal legislation to control prescription prices under Medicare,
or government regulatory efforts to reduce litter, and in enhancing perceptions of
the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship of the front group itself. However,
Hypothesis 1 also posited that front-group stealth campaigns fail to influence public
perceptions of corporate sponsors, who remain unknown. Hypothesis 2 predicted
that, if front-group stealth campaigns are exposed, it produces a backlash against
front groups and their corporate sponsors.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were tested with a series of repeated measure ANOVA tests.
Within-subjects effects were computed using the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment,
which corrects for problems with sphericity, and then by planned comparisons using
Dunn’s multiple comparison procedure (Kirk, 1982) for all predicted effects and cor-
related t-tests for any unpredicted effects.1
The omnibus results are reported first. Then, the patterns of means are examined
more closely as Hypothesis 2 and 3 are each evaluated in turn. The repeated mea-
sures ANOVAs, with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections, revealed significant differ-
ences across Phases 1, 3, and 4 on attitude toward the issue in question, F(2, 383) =
5.10, p < .01, η2 = .025; and on perceptions of front group image, F(2, 385) = 9.07,
p < .01, η2 = .04; reputation, F(2, 331) = 66.925, p < .01, η2 = .25; credibility, F(2,
376) = 59.73, p < .01, η2 = .23; and citizenship, F(2, 342) = 87.81, p < .01, η2 = .30.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that front-group stealth campaigns are effective in the
short term in influencing public perceptions about targeted attitudes and in enhanc-
ing perceptions of the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship of the front
group itself.
The results indicated that front-group stealth campaigns are effective in eroding
public attitudes favoring federal efforts to restrict wetlands development, federal leg-
islation to control prescription prices under Medicare, or government regulatory
efforts to reduce litter. A planned comparison revealed that people’s attitudes toward
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the issues in question deteriorated between Phase 1 (M = 5.57) and Phase 3 (M =
5.31), following exposure to the front-group stealth campaign message, F(1, 201) =
9.49, p < .01, η2 = .02.
The results also indicated that front-group stealth campaigns are effective in
enhancing public perceptions of the front group itself. Planned comparisons revealed
that people’s perceptions of front groups grew more positive between Phase 1 and
Phase 3, following exposure to the front-group stealth campaign message. This pat-
tern manifested itself across all front group measures: image, F(1, 202) = 15.95, p <
.01, η2 = .08; reputation, F(1, 202) = 10.875, p < .01, η2 = .06; credibility, F(1, 203) =
15.69, p < .01, η2 = .08; and citizenship, F(1, 203) = 14.37, p < .01, η2 = .08. The
Phase 1 and 3 front group means are shown in Table 1. Finally, the results revealed
no differences in people’s perceptions of front-group corporate sponsors. The Phase
1 and 3 front-group corporate sponsor means are depicted in Table 2.
The pattern of results provides unequivocal support for Hypothesis 1. Front-
group stealth campaigns undermined perceptions of the targeted attitude object,
eroding support for federal restriction on wetlands development, federal legislation
to control prescription prices under Medicare, or government regulatory efforts to
reduce litter. In addition, the front-group stealth campaigns enhanced perceptions of
the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship of the front group itself. However,
front-group stealth campaigns failed to influence public perceptions of corporate
sponsors, who still were unknown to participants at Phase 3. The pattern of results
was consistent across all measures.
Hypothesis 2 posited that, if front-group stealth campaigns are exposed, it results
in a backlash against front groups and their corporate sponsors. The omnibus results
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Table 1
Participants’ Perceptions of Front Groups Across Time
Phase 1 Phase 3 Phase 4
Dependent Variable M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Image (n = 203) 4.26 (.72) 4.52a (.78) 4.31c (.54)
Reputation (n = 203) 4.57 (.82) 4.87a (.94) 3.94b (1.25)
Credibility (n = 204) 4.78 (.91) 5.15a (1.06) 4.18b (1.20)
Citizenship (n = 204) 4.76 (.81) 5.12a (.97) 3.99b (1.27)
Note: Perceptions of front-group image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship were measured using 1-7-
interval scales. Higher scores indicated more positive perceptions about front groups.
a. Significantly more positive perceptions following the administration of the front-group campaign mes-
sage at Phase 3 compared to initial assessment at Phase 1 at p < .01.
b. Significantly more negative perceptions following exposure of the front-group’s true intentions and cor-
porate sponsors at Phase 4 compared to assessment at Phase 1 at p < .01.
c. Significantly more negative perceptions following exposure of the front-group’s true intentions and cor-
porate sponsors at Phase 4 compared to assessment at Phase 3 at p < .01.
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for attitudes about the issue in question and perceptions of front groups across Phases
1, 3, and 4 were reported above. The omnibus results for corporate sponsors of front
groups are reported next. The repeated measures ANOVAs, with Greenhouse-Geisser
corrections, revealed significant differences across Phases 1, 3, and 4 on the depen-
dent measures of perceptions of the corporate sponsors of front groups: image, F(2,
395) = 3.39, p < .05, η2 = .02; reputation, F(2, 363) = 31.01, p < .01, η2 = .13; cred-
ibility, F(2, 370) = 22.73, p < .01, η2 = .10; and citizenship, F(2, 380) = 22.15, p <
.01, η2 = .10.
Three sets of results are required to evaluate Hypothesis 2. Patterns of means are
examined involving attitudes about the issue in question, perceptions of the front
groups, and perceptions of corporate sponsors of front groups.
First, the results revealed that, when front-group stealth campaigns are exposed,
the effects previously documented on targeted attitudes dissipate. A correlated t test
assessed Phase 3 attitudes toward the issue in question (supporting federal restriction
on wetlands development, federal legislation to control prescription drug prices
under Medicare, or government regulatory efforts to reduce litter) (previous results
revealed that front-group stealth campaigns influenced Phase 3 attitudes), with Phase
4 attitudes, after exposure. The results, t(202) = 2.72, p < .01, indicated that, follow-
ing exposure, people’s Phase 4 attitudes (M = 5.52) rebounded from Phase 3 (M =
5.31) to near-Phase 1 levels (M = 5.57). In other words, exposure reversed the effects
of front-group stealth campaigns on targeted attitudes.
Second, the results indicated that, following exposure, perceptions of front groups
deteriorated, usually below Phase 1 levels. Planned comparisons on Phase 4 percep-
tions of front groups, following exposure, versus Phase 1 perceptions revealed that
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Table 2
Participants’ Perceptions of Front-Groups’ Corporate
Sponsors Across Time
Phase 1 Phase 3 Phase 4
Dependent Variable M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Image (n = 204) 5.25 (.90) 5.36 (.93) 5.19b (.98)
Reputation (n = 204) 5.08 (1.06) 5.23 (1.11) 4.55a (1.29)
Credibility (n = 204) 5.15 (1.01) 5.26 (1.16) 4.63a (1.22)
Citizenship (n = 202) 5.01 (.94) 4.91 (1.22) 4.39a (1.26)
Note: Perceptions of front-groups’ corporate sponsors’ image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship were
measured using 1-7 interval scales. Higher scores indicated more positive perceptions about front-groups’
corporate sponsors.
a. Significantly more negative perceptions following exposure of the front-group’s true intentions and cor-
porate sponsors at Phase 4 compared to assessment at Phase 1 at p < .01.
b. Significantly more negative perceptions following exposure of the front-group’s true intentions and cor-
porate sponsors at Phase 4 compared to assessment at Phase 3 at p < .05.
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exposure significantly undermined perceptions. This was evident for perceptions of
front group reputation, F(1, 202) = 97.96, p < .01, η2 = .27; credibility, F(1, 203) =
41.26, p < .01, η2 = .21; and citizenship, F(1, 203) = 65.73, p < .01, η2 = .36. Front
group image didn’t erode beneath Phase 1 levels; however, Phase 4 image declined
significantly compared to Phase 3 image, following the front-group stealth campaign
message, t(202) = –3.05, p < .01.
Third, the results revealed that exposure, which identified corporate sponsors of
front-group stealth campaigns, damages perceptions of these corporations. The
planned comparisons assessing Phase 4 perceptions of corporate sponsors of front-
group stealth campaigns, following exposure, and Phase 1 perceptions found that
exposure undermined corporate sponsors’ reputation, F(1, 203) = 63.67, p < .01, η2 =
.21; credibility, F(1, 203) = 42.43, p < .01, η2 = .21; and citizenship, F(1, 201) =
48.525, p < .01, η2 = .28. Perceptions of the image of corporate sponsors didn’t drop
beneath Phase 1 levels; however, Phase 4 image dipped below Phase 3 image, which
was assessed following the front-group stealth campaign message, t(203) = –2.235,
p < .05.
This pattern of results supports Hypothesis 2. All data support the position that,
if front-group stealth campaigns are exposed, it produces a backlash. The backlash
erodes the influence of campaigns on targeted attitudes, diminishes perceptions of
front groups, usually below Phase 1 levels, and seriously damages perceptions of cor-
porate sponsors, again usually beneath Phase 1 levels. In short, the results indicate
that exposure totally negates the influence of front-group campaigns and damages
corporate sponsors of such campaigns.
Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicted that inoculation messages confer resistance to the
influence of front-group stealth campaigns. To evaluate this prediction, a one-way
MANCOVA was computed assessing the effect of experimental condition (control
vs. inoculation treatment) on: Phase 2 elicited threat and counterarguing output, which
together indicate whether the inoculation manipulation took, Phase 3 and 4 attitudes
toward the targeted issue, and Phase 3 and 4 perceptions of front groups. Initial atti-
tude and issue involvement served as covariates.
The omnibus MANCOVA was nearly significant for the covariate of initial atti-
tude, F(12, 174) = 1.62, p < .10, η2 = .10, with univariate tests revealing significant
effects on Phase 2 elicited threat, F(1, 185) = 3.95, p < .05, η2 = .02, and Phase 4
attitude toward the targeted issue, F(1, 185) = 10.59, p < .01, η2 = .04. Betas were
positive, thus indicating that initial attitude toward the targeted issue was positively
related to Phase 2 threat and Phase 4 attitude. The omnibus MANCOVA also
revealed a significant effect for the covariate of initial issue involvement, F(12, 174) =
2.50, p < .01, η2 = .15, with univariate tests revealing significant effects on the
dependent variables of Phase 3, F(1, 185) = 12.81, p < .01, η2 = .06, and Phase 4,
F(1, 185) = 15.37, p < .01, η2 = .06, attitudes toward the targeted issue. Betas were
positive, thus indicating that initial issue involvement was positively related to Phase
3 and Phase 4 attitudes.
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The omnibus MANCOVA was significant for experimental condition F(12, 174) =
1.83, p < .05, η2 = .11. Subsequent planned comparisons examining inoculation and
control conditions revealed that the inoculation manipulation elicited Phase 2 threat,
F(1, 185) = 3.02, p < .05, η2 = .02, and counterarguing, F(1, 185) = 5.82, p < .01, η2 =
.03, as inoculation theory posits. In addition, compared to controls, the inoculation
treatments protected participants against the slippage of targeted attitudes at Phase
3, following the front-group stealth campaign message, F(1, 185) = 3.75, p < .01, η2 =
.02, and at Phase 4, following exposure of front groups, F(1, 185) = 8.48, p < .01, η2 =
.03. There were no significant univariate effects involving front-group perceptions.
These means are shown in Table 3.
The results support Hypothesis 3. Inoculation protects against the influence of
front-group stealth campaign on targeted attitudes, although effects were modest.
Discussion
The current study examined front-group stealth campaigns, in which corpora-
tions, working collectively through industry-based associations, use deceptive
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Table 3
Effectiveness of Inoculation Treatments in Eliciting Phase 2 Threat and
Counterarguing Output and in Promoting Resistance to the Influence of
Front-Group Campaign Messages as Manifested in Terms of Participants’
Time 3 and Time 4 Attitudes Toward the Issue and/or Cause
Under Pressure From the Front-Group Campaign 
Dependent Measures
Counterarguing Time 3 Time 4
Threat Output Attitude Attitude 
Experimental Condition n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD)
Control condition 88 3.46 (1.22) 85 .49 (.82) 87 5.13 (1.34) 88 5.27 (1.28)
Inoculation condition 116 3.76b (1.25) 109 1.57a (.41) 116 5.45a (1.17) 116 5.70a (1.05)
Note: Experimental condition was operationalized as control and inoculation treatment. Phase 2 elicited
threat was assessed using 7-interval scales. Higher scores indicate greater elicited threat. Counterarguing
output was operationalized as an average of participant identification of the number of responses to argu-
ments opposing initial attitudes (counterarguments) times the average rating of those arguments minus the
number of arguments opposing initial attitudes times the average ratings of those arguments. Higher
scores indicate more counterarguing output. Participants’ Phase 3 and Phase 4 attitudes toward the issue
and/or cause were assessed using 7-interval scales. Higher scores signify more positive attitudes about the
issue and/or cause and less influence of the front-group message designed to undermine those attitudes
and, therefore, greater resistance.
a. Significant compared to control condition at p < .01.
b. Significant compared to control condition at p < .05.
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names that mask true interests of sponsors in an attempt to influence public opin-
ion on social and/or political issues of interest to industry groups. The current study
began with the resignation that front-group stealth campaigns are effective in influ-
encing public opinion, unless they are exposed as intentionally misleading, in
which case they boomerang against sponsors. Finally, the experiment examined the
potential of inoculation to preempt the influence of corporate front-group stealth
campaigns. The pattern of results of the experiment offered unequivocal support for
these expectations.
Despite their long history and proliferation of use in recent years, (Beder, 1998;
Stauber & Rampton, 1995), there has been no research about the influence of cor-
porate front-group stealth campaigns or about potential remedies. The current inves-
tigation offered two arguments as to why such campaigns should work. Front-group
stealth campaigns should work because the public is low involved on most matters
of public policy (Bernays, 1923, 1928; Dahl, 1963; Lippmann, 1922), and in those
circumstances people rely on shortcuts to process messages, including descriptive
titles that are designed to resonate with the receiver’s values (Dahl, 1961; Fiske &
Taylor, 1991; Lupia, 1994; Popkin, 1991). This rationale is consistent with the
dual processing models, such as the ELM and HSM, which posit that peripheral cues
like names (ELM) or decision rules such as, “I agree with groups that support my
values” (HSM), dominate in low involving circumstances. Furthermore, such cam-
paigns operate on the premise that truth is malleable, a position that traces its origins
to James (1907) and was accepted by the two most prominent public relations coun-
cils of the 20th century, Ivy Ledbetter Lee and Edward Bernays.
The results indicated that front-group stealth campaigns were effective, at least in
the short term. Front-group stealth campaigns eroded public attitudes toward the
issue in question (public attitudes favoring government efforts to restrict wetlands
development, federal legislation to control prescription drug prices under Medicare,
and government regulatory efforts to reduce litter) and boosted perceptions of the
front group, but not the corporate sponsor, which was as yet unidentified. In short,
front-group stealth campaigns do exactly what corporate sponsors intend. They
work, in part because the public is low involved on most issues; as a result, they do
not cognitively engage campaign messages, relying on processing shortcuts, like an
advocacy group’s name that appears to resonate with people’s values. This rationale
is consistent with Bernays (1928), Lippmann (1922), and Popkin (1991), who main-
tain that simple images, like catchy names and slogans, are persuasive, and consis-
tent with contemporary dual-processing models, such as the ELM and HSM, which
maintain that low-involved message processing is superficial, consisting of very little
substantive thought (Chaiken, 1987; Petty et al., 1981; Petty et al., 1983; Todorov
et al., 2002).
However, this investigation argued that front-group campaign influence tends to
be ephemeral, if challenged. James maintained that perception is truth, if unchallenged;
however, it erodes in the face of counterinformation. Research in the dual processing
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domain reveals that those perceptions formed in low involving circumstances lack
persistence and are readily susceptible to change (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Eagly,
1983; Krosnick, 1988; Mackie, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The results of the
current study supported the transient nature of front-group stealth initiatives, once
exposed. When front-group stealth campaigns were subsequently exposed, the initial
effects on public attitudes toward the issue in question and enhanced perceptions of
front groups dissipated. Attitudes toward the issue in question reverted to precam-
paign levels and people’s perceptions of front-group reputation, credibility, and cit-
izenship dipped beneath precampaign levels. Also, perceptions of corporate sponsors
of front groups boomeranged. Perceptions of corporate sponsors’ image slipped to
precampaign levels and perceptions of sponsors’ reputation, credibility, and citizen-
ship plummeted beneath precampaign levels. The results indicate that exposure,
which reveals the corporate sponsors and true motives of corporate front-group
stealth campaigns, backfires, not only against efforts to shape the attitude object but
also against the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship assessments of front
groups and their corporate sponsors. In short, there is significant risk associated with
front-group stealth campaigns, which sponsors ignore at their peril.
Finally, the investigation tested the potential of inoculation to provide an antidote
to the influence of front-group stealth campaigns. The results indicated that inocula-
tion can ameliorate the influence of front-group stealth campaigns on pubic atti-
tudes toward the issue in question, in the current study minimizing such campaign’s
attempts to undermine public support for federal efforts to restrict wetlands devel-
opment, federal legislation to control prescription drug prices under Medicare, and
government regulatory efforts to reduce litter. However, inoculation did not effect
public perceptions of front groups.
These results provide further evidence of inoculation’s efficacy, particularly the
effectiveness of generic inoculation treatments that target a broad class of campaigns
(Pfau, Park, et al., 2001). However, overall inoculation effects were relatively weak.
Although the inoculation manipulation took, as evidenced by the higher elicited
threat levels and greater counterarguing output for inoculated versus control partici-
pants, the variances accounted for were low on all dependent variables: threat, coun-
terarguing output, and Phase 3 and Phase 4 attitude toward the issue.
Overall, the current investigation suggests two antidotes to the influence of front-
group stealth campaigns. Inoculation is a preemptive strategy. It deflects the influ-
ence of such campaigns on public attitudes toward social and/or political issues,
which is the primary purpose of such campaigns. Exposure is a post hoc strategy. It
reverses the influence of front-group stealth campaigns and undermines perceptions
of front groups and corporate sponsors.
These findings are important because, otherwise, corporate front-group stealth
campaigns operate unchecked. The results of this investigation indicate that front-
group stealth campaigns exert significant influence on public attitudes. Yet they oper-
ate under the radar screen. As a result, their influence is more insidious. Given their
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growing role in the public arena, it is crucial for the public to learn the sponsors and
intent of messages designed to sway opinion. Things are not always what they seem.
Limitations
We acknowledge two caveats about the results of the current investigation. First, the
current study employed college undergraduates as participants. College undergraduates
are not representative of the general population, and their political attitudes tend to be
“more unstable, changeable, weak, and inconsistent” compared to older age cohorts
(Sears, 1986, p. 522). As a result, the pattern of results of the current study may over-
state the influence of front-group campaign messages and the impact of messages
exposing front groups, although there is no reason to believe that it would affect the effi-
cacy of inoculation treatments. Second, the methodology employed in the current study
induced more cognitive activity than would be likely in a more natural setting. By pre-
senting participants with messages, the current study called attention to them. In natural
settings in which people view television or read newspapers or magazines, communi-
cation messages are less likely to be singled out for processing and, if they are noticed,
they are more likely to be processed passively, absent cognitive engagement.
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1. The current investigation was interested in the influence of front-group stealth campaign messages,
the impact of exposure of front groups, and the potential of inoculation to deflect the influence of front-
group campaigns. The current study featured three front-group exemplars to ensure generalizability of
findings, although no predictions or questions addressed differences between exemplars. Nonetheless,
researchers tested for differences across exemplars on Phase 3 and 4 attitudes toward the issue (govern-
ment action to restrict wetlands development, control prescription prices under Medicare, and reduce lit-
ter) and on Phase 3 and 4 measures of perceptions of the image, reputation, credibility, and citizenship of
front groups and their corporate sponsors using one-way MANOVA. Scheffe post hoc tests were com-
puted to assess mean differences for all significant omnibus effects. The pattern of results was consistent.
At Phases 3 and 4, the Pepsi-Cola KAB front group and Exxon-Mobil NWC front group were more pos-
itively perceived than the Merck CBM front group, and Pepsi-Cola and Exxon-Mobil were more posi-
tively perceived than Merck. Because people’s perceptions of the three front-group exemplars were
similar at Phase 1, we can only speculate that the Pepsi-Cola KAB and Exxon-Mobil NWC front-group
messages were more influential than the Merck CBM front-group message. However, inspection of the
pattern of means across Phases 1, 3, and 4 in people’s perceptions of front groups and their corporate
sponsors and the pattern of means of inoculation and control participants revealed results consistent with
the main findings of the current study. Furthermore, the results of a 3 (front-group exemplars) × 2 (inoc-
ulation versus controls) MANCOVA revealed no interaction effects.References
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